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Crop farmers are enjoying re-cord high profi ts because of dramatically higher market 
prices. Farmers’ increased demand 
for land, seed, fertilizer, and machin-
ery has resulted in higher prices and 
profi ts for sellers of these inputs as 
well. One industry that is also enjoy-
ing the higher crop prices is the crop 
insurance industry. It benefi ts from 
higher prices because the formulas 
used to determine industry revenue 
automatically generate higher expect-
ed subsidies as crop prices rise. Ac-
tual subsidies depend in part on crop 
losses, but administrative and oper-
ating subsidies are directly tied to 
crop prices. Figure 1 shows how total 
industry revenues from insuring the 
nation’s corn, soybean, wheat, and 
cotton farmers have risen in recent 
years. Revenues could rise by another 
25 percent in 2008 if crop losses are 
similar to those in 2007.
You might think that the formulas 
used to subsidize the industry would 
be tied to industry workload or ef-
fort rather than crop prices. After all, 
rarely are government-paid salaries 
tied directly to a commodity price. 
But as shown in Figure 2, the number 
of corn, soybean, wheat, and cotton 
policies written since 2000 has been 
fl at. That is, agent and company work-
loads since 2000 for these four crops 
have not increased, yet agent commis-
sions over this time have increased 
by a factor of four.
The salaries of crop insurance 
company employees and claims 
adjustors are largely determined by 
market forces. After all, why should 
the salary of a crop insurance com-
pany vice president or computer pro-
grammer be any higher than needed 
to keep that employee in the job? A 
recent report sponsored by National 
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Figure 1. Total crop industry revenue from corn, soybeans, wheat, and 
cotton since 2000
Figure 2. Policies serviced for four crops and associated total agent 
commissions
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to generate reserves to cover years 
with negative underwriting gains. 
However, farmers in the Corn Belt 
are beginning to wonder whether 
crop insurance is such a good deal 
for them. Why should they be asked 
year after year to generate large un-
derwriting gains so that the indus-
try will be willing to offer insurance 
in other states? Why should they 
keep generating excessive annual 
agent commissions when they rare-
ly receive payments that exceed 
their premiums? Since 2000, agent 
commissions on policies sold to 
corn and soybean farmers in Iowa, 
Illinois, and Indiana have totaled 
more than $933 million, whereas 
corn and soybean farmers in these 
three states have paid $768 million 
more in premiums than they have 
collected in indemnities.
The initial push in early 2007 by 
the National Corn Growers Associa-
tion to include a county revenue coun-
tercyclical program in the new farm 
bill refl ected a belief by corn farmers 
that a reduction in the role of the crop 
insurance industry as a risk-manage-
ment middleman would better serve 
both farmers and taxpayers. Their 
county program was immediately op-
posed by the crop insurance industry 
because it would have dramatically 
increased the proportion of taxpayer 
support for risk management that 
would have fl owed directly to farm-
ers. Given the results of the analysis 
shared here, it is clear why their pro-
posal was also attacked by politicians 
and commodity groups from Great 
Plains states: reducing participation 
in crop insurance by Corn Belt farm-
ers would dramatically reduce indus-
try profi ts, which would threaten the 
willingness of companies to insure 
farmers in states where premiums 
have not kept pace with losses.
It’s possible that an optional 
state-level revenue countercyclical 
program will emerge in the new farm 
bill. However, it would not be surpris-
ing if those farmers who opt for this 
policy will be required to purchase 
crop insurance. Such a requirement 
would refl ect the infl uence of indus-
try interests that are aligned with 
regional interests in maintaining, 
for as long as possible, the current 
structure of the program. ◆ 
Note of Disclosure: The author has 
worked as a consultant for the National 
Corn Growers Association estimating the 
cost of various farm bill alternatives.
Corn Belt Contributions to the Crop 
Insurance Industry
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Figure 3. Agent commission per corn, soybean, wheat, and cotton         
policy sold
Crop Insurance Services shows that 
all cost categories but one have large-
ly tracked with general labor markets. 
The one exception is agent commis-
sions, which track directly with crop 
prices and premiums in the program. 
As shown in Figure 3, this means that 
the commission per written policy 
has increased from $351 per policy 
in 2000 to an estimated $1,357 per 
policy in 2008. The reason for this rise 
in agent commissions is that under 
crop insurance rules, companies can-
not compete on the prices of policies 
because these are set by the govern-
ment. The only way for companies 
to compete with each other is to vie 
for agents’ policies. This competition 
results in changes in taxpayer subsi-
dies being directly refl ected in agent 
commissions.  ◆
Note: Policy numbers are calculated 
from data obtained from the RMA Sum-
mary of Business Reports. Commissions 
are calculated from “Federal Crop Insur-
ance Program Profi tability and Effective-
ness Analysis, 2007 Update,” prepared 
on behalf of the National Crop Insurance 
Services by Grant Thornton LLP.
